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We examine the effects of coordinated trade-tax reforms and isolated tariff reforms on 
market access, government revenue and welfare for a small monetary economy, under 
the assumption that a certain fraction of purchases of each good must be financed with 
cash held in advance. Moreover, we allow for this fraction of purchases to vary across 
markets, in the sense that the required amount of money balances per unit of value is 
different for each good. We show that: i) a uniform radial reduction of tariffs has 
ambiguous effects on both welfare and market access ii) coordinated tariff-tax reforms 
are more efficient in improving market access and welfare than a reform that involves 
only tariffs and iii) export and production tax reforms that keep producer prices 
unchanged might be welfare deteriorating.  
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 1. Introduction    
IMF’s and World Bank’s structural adjustment and stabilization programs often 
involve a reduction in trade taxes that is accompanied by an increase in consumption 
taxes.
1 For this reason, there has been a lot of attention paid to the welfare, revenue 
and market access effects of such trade-tax reforms. The results established in the 
trade and tax reform literature, noted below, have indubitably generated important 
policy implications. However, the theoretical work on these issues has so far been 
conducted exclusively within a non-monetary framework. A natural question 
therefore arises: How do trade–tax reform strategies affect welfare, market access, and 
government revenue when carried out in a monetary economy? The purpose of this 
paper is to re-examine these issues within a monetary framework. We consider 
isolated tariff reforms as well as two types of joint reform strategies that are very 
common in the literature: i) a reduction in import tariffs combined with an increase in 
consumption taxes so as to keep consumer prices unchanged, and ii) a reduction in 
export taxes combined with an increase in production taxes so as to leave producer 
prices unchanged.  
In the existing trade and tax reform literature, the main result has been that 
reductions in import tariffs (export taxes) combined with increases in consumption 
taxes (production taxes) improve welfare and government revenue (see, among others, 
Michael et al. 1993, Hatzipanayotou et al. 1994, Keen and Ligthart 2002, and Emran 
2005).
2 This occurs because a tariff-tax reform that leaves consumer prices unchanged 
improves production efficiency, by reducing the excessive production of the 
importable goods, and at the same time increases government revenue, by reducing 
the implicit production subsidies. Likewise, an export and production tax reform that 
keeps producer prices unaffected improves consumption efficiency, by reducing 
excessive consumption of the exportable goods, and at the same time increases 
government revenue, by reducing implicit consumption subsidies.      
Since market access plays an important role in trade negotiations, the recent 
literature has also analyzed the market access effects of tariff changes.
3 For example, 
Ju and  Krishna (2000) show that tariff reductions that improve welfare may hurt 
market access. Anderson and Neary (2007) and Falvey and Kreickemeier (2008) 
                                                 
1 See, for example, IMF (2005) and Rajaram (1994). 
2 A notable exception is Emran and Stiglitz (2005), who show that in the presence of an informal sector 
coordinated trade-tax reforms may reduce welfare. 
3 Market access is defined as the value of imports at world prices. 
  1identify tariff reform rules that ensure an improvement in welfare and market access. 
Finally, Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008) (henceforth KR) consider the 
welfare and market access effects of combined tariff-tax reforms and show that such 
reforms are less efficient in improving welfare and market access than simple tariff 
reductions alone.  
  The importance of analyzing what may seem as purely international trade 
issues within a monetary environment has been demonstrated by Palivos and Yip 
(1997a,b), who derive the welfare effects of tariffs and import quotas, respectively, in 
a generalized cash-in-advance model. They show that the presence of a cash-in-
advance constraint may alter standard results in the international trade literature, by 
introducing a wedge between the relative prices of goods faced by consumers and the 
world relative prices that are still relevant to the domestic producers. In a similar 
framework, Chao and Yu (1999) investigate the shadow price of foreign exchange, 
whereas Chao and Yip (2000, 2001) re-examine the optimal trade policy in the 
presence of sector-specific unemployment and non-traded goods, respectively. Palivos 
and Yip (2006) determine the optimal trade policies in a monetary economy with 
endogenous labor supply and learning by doing.  
This paper differs from the aforementioned literature in several aspects. First, it 
does not seek to characterize the optimal tariff or tax, which is the main concern of the 
money-trade literature; rather it takes as a starting point the existence of arbitrary 
levels of distortionary tariffs and/or taxes, as is the case in the trade and tax reform 
literature. Second, unlike the existing money-trade literature, it analyzes situations 
that involve more than one policy instrument. Third, it is concerned not only with 
welfare but also with the effects of trade and tax policies on government revenue and 
market access. Finally, the paper complements the tariff and tax reform literature in 
that it examines similar issues in the presence of liquidity constraints, which are 
important especially in developing countries.
4           
Our model examines tariff and tax reforms in the context of a small open 
monetary economy, where money is introduced in the economy via a generalized 
cash-in-advance (henceforth CIA) constraint, in such a way that cash requirements per 
unit of value purchased differs across goods. In this framework, we re-examine the 
effects of isolated tariff reforms and coordinated tariff-tax reforms on welfare, 
                                                 
4 Evidence for the existence of liquidity constraints similar to the ones considered here can be found in, 
among others, Palivos and Yip (1997a, b). 
  2government revenue, and market access. We show that, in a monetary economy, a 
uniform radial reduction of tariffs (a reduction of all tariffs by the same proportion) 
has ambiguous effects not only on market access but also on welfare. Moreover, in 
contrast with the results derived in KR, a reduction of import tariffs combined with an 
equal increase in consumption taxes may improve welfare and market access by more 
than an isolated tariff reduction. These results arise because the presence of a CIA 
constraint causes an extra monetary distortion in the economy, which is exacerbated 
under tariff reforms, whereas it remains constant under coordinated tariff-tax reforms. 
Also, we re-examine the welfare effects of another type of reform strategy, whereby a 
reduction in the export taxes is combined with an offsetting increase in production 
taxes so as to keep the producer prices unchanged.
5 In this case, we show that, again 
contrary to previous results, such a reform may lead to a decrease in welfare. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical model. Section 3 examines the effects of isolated tariff reforms and 
coordinated tariff-tax reforms on welfare and market access. Section 4 examines the 
welfare effects of export and production tax reforms. Section 5 concludes with a brief 
summary.  
 
2. The model      
Consider a small open monetary economy that produces and consumes   tradable 
goods. Let one good indexed by zero ‘‘0’’ be the numeraire,
1 N +
6 
w p  the vector of world 
prices of the   non-numeraire goods,  ( N 0 t > 0 < ) the specific import tariffs (export 
taxes), and ε  the production taxes, respectively. Then the vector of the domestic 
producer prices of the non-numeraire goods is given by 
w p pt ε = +− . On the other 
hand, the vector of the domestic consumer prices is given by 
w qp t τ = ++, where τ  
denotes specific consumption taxes. There are no taxes applied on the numeraire 
good, i.e.,  00
w
0 p qp ==.
7  
                                                 
5 See Keen and Ligthart (2002), Emran and Stiglitz (2003), and Emran (2005) for this type of reform.   
6 Note that more than one goods can be untaxed and serve as a composite numeraire good (see Emran 
2005, and Anderson and Neary 2007). 
7 The numeraire good can be an importable good as well (see Emran 2005). In fact, for reasons that will 
become transparent later, in Section 4 we assume that the non-numeraire goods are the exportable 
goods while the numeraire good is the importable.  
  3Consumers maximize their utility function  0 ( ,..., ), n uu D D =  where   is the 
consumption of the   commodity, 
i D
th i 0,1,...., iN = . A crucial element of this economy 
is that a certain fraction of purchases of each good must be financed with cash. More 
specifically, as in Palivos and Yip (1997a,b), we assume the following generalized 
cash-in-advance (CIA) or liquidity constraint  
 
                            00 xm qD qD M φ φ ′ +≤ ,                                                       
 
where, in addition to the   and  , 0 q q
8 the cash-requirement ratios for purchasing the 
exportable and importable goods are denoted by  x φ , m φ , respectively, and are 
positive scalars (0 1, , ) i ix m φ ≤≤ = , and M  is the total money demand. Palivos 
and Yip (1997a,b) offer empirical evidence regarding the existence of such a 
generalized CIA constraint.  
The consumer’s utility maximization problem can be represented in terms of its 
dual of cost minimization. The expenditure function is defined as: 
[ ] [ 00 0 0 0 0 (1 ) ,(1 ) , min : ( , )  and  xm xm Eq q uq D q D M u D D u q D q φφ φ φ D ′ ′ ++= + + = + =
  ] M . Assuming that the price of the numeraire good is equal to 1, we can write the 
expenditure function as  (1, (1 ), ) Eq u δ +  where  ( ) (1 ), mx x δ φφ φ =− +  1, δ <  denotes 
the implicit price markup that the consumer must pay due to the monetary distortion 
introduced by the CIA constraint. We refer to  (1 ) v qqδ = +  as the virtual price vector 
of the non-numeraire goods.
9 Note that the asymmetric cash requirements between 
exportable and importable goods generates a consumption distortion, measured by the 
size of  x φ  relative to that of  m φ . In the special case   0 xm φ φ = =  we have a barter 
economy, where no cash is required for the purchase of a good, whereas when 
0, xm φ φ =>  and hence  0, δ =  the cash-requirement ratios are the same across all 
goods in the economy.
10  
                                                 
8 A prime denotes transposition of a vector.  
9 Notice that δ  captures the proportional increase or decrease in the domestic consumer prices, 
depending on whether  x φ  is greater or smaller than  m φ , owing to the monetary distortion (CIA 
constraint).  
10 Palivos and Yip (2006) show that if there exists an endogenous labor-leisure choice, then the results 
in the case where  0 xm φ φ = > are still different from the ones obtained in a barter economy, simply 
because, contrary to other goods, leisure is not subject to a liquidity constraint.   
  4Let  0 (, ) R pp  denote the revenue function; it gives the maximum value of 
domestic production given the domestic producer prices ( 0, p p). The equilibrium of 
this economy requires that total spending   on goods and money holdings be 
equal to the income from production of private goods 
( , ) v Eq u
( ) R p , plus the money supply 
M , plus all tax revenue  , which we assume that the government redistributes in a 




  (, ) ( ) v E qu Rp M G = ++ .  (1)
 
The government tax revenue is generated from three forms of taxes, namely trade, 
consumption and production taxes. We often refer to the last two forms as “domestic” 
taxes. Thus, 
          
                          ()
vv v qp q p q Gt E R E R E R p τ εγλ ′′ ′ ′ =− + + =+ ′ ,  (2)
                                                 
where  t γ τ =+ denotes the total tax burden rate on consumption, and  t λ ε =−  is the 
total tax burden rate on production. Also, the partial derivatives of the expenditure 
function with respect to   and  ,  and  , denote respectively, the reciprocal of 
the marginal utility of income and the compensated demand vector. The derivative of 
the revenue function with respect to
u v q u E
v q E
p , p R , on the other hand, denotes the supply 
vector in the economy. We follow standard assumptions in the literature and assume 
that  and 
vv qq E pp R  are negative and positive definite, respectively.  
Market access is defined as the value of imports at world market prices (Ju and 
Krishna 2000) 
          
  (, ) ()
v
w
qv p Ap Eq uRp ′ ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ .  (3)
We conclude this section by deriving the effects of changes in trade and 
domestic taxes on government revenue, welfare and market access. Totally 
differentiating equation (2) we obtain 
 
         ( ) (1 )
vv v v qu qq q p p p dG E du E E dq R R dp γδ γ λ ⎡⎤ ′′ ′ ′ =+ ++ + − ⎣⎦ ′
                                                
,                       (4) 
 
11 Henceforth, to simplify the notation, we omit the price of the numeraire good from both the 
expenditure and the revenue functions. 
  5 
where (1 ) (1 )( ) v dq dq dt d δ δ =+ =+ + τ  and dp dt dε = − . Moreover, differentiating 
equation (1) and using equation (4), we have 
                              
                                 ,                           (5)  (1 )
vv v qq q p p du E E dq R dp δγ δ λ ⎡⎤ ′′ ′ Ω= + − + ⎣⎦
 
where   assuming that goods are normal in consumption. Finally, 
differentiation of equation (3) results in 
() 0,
v uq u EE γ′ Ω= − >
  
                              .                              (6)  (1 )
vv v
ww w
qq p p qu dA p E dq p R dp p E du δ ′′ ′ =+ − +
 
Equations (4), (5) and (6) are the main equations of the model and are used to 
examine the effects of trade-tax reforms on government revenue, welfare and market 
access. 
  
3. Tariff -Tax Reforms              
In this section we examine reforms that involve i) only tariffs and ii) tariff and 
consumption taxes. We are interested in the effects of such reforms on welfare, 
government revenue and market access for the small open monetary economy, 
described in Section 2 above.  
 
3.1. Tariff Reform 
Consider a uniform radial reduction of all import tariffs, i.e.,dt t θ = − , where θ  is a 
small positive scalar, while consumption and production taxes remain zero 
(i.e., 0, τ = 0) ε = . Then, with only tariffs dq dt = ,  dp dt = ,  t γ = , and  t λ =− , 
where it may be recalled that q and p denoted domestic consumer and producer prices, 
whereas  γ  and  λ  are the total tax burden rates on consumption and production, 
respectively. Using equation (4), the effect of a radial reduction of all import tariffs on 
welfare is 
  ( )
v q du t S E dt δ ′′ Ω= − ()
v q tS E t θ δ ′ ′ = −− ,  (7)
  6where  (1 )
vv qq p p SE R δ ≡+ −  in equations (7) and (8) is a negative definite matrix.
12
Furthermore, using equations (4) and (7), we obtain          
                
        () (1 )
vv v qu q p u q dG t E du E R t t St E du E R t θθ θ δ ⎡ ⎤ ′′ ′ ′ ′ =− − − = − + − ′ ⎣ ⎦ .  (8)
 
Equation (7) shows that a uniform radial reduction of all import tariffs affects welfare 
through two effects. The first term on the RHS,  , tS t θ ′ −  is positive and denotes the 
standard welfare effect of a change in tariffs.  The second term on the RHS,  ,
v q E t θδ ′  
represents the indirect effect of a radial reduction of imports tariffs on welfare, and is 
due to the asymmetric cash requirements. In a barter economy, where a financial 
constraint is absent, i.e., 0 xm φ φ ==  and hence  0, δ =  a uniform proportional decrease 
in all tariffs increases welfare unambiguously. This is a standard result in international 
trade literature within a barter economy context.
13 The same result also holds in a 
monetary framework in the special case where  0 xm φ φ = >  and hence  0 δ =  again, 
i.e., the cash requirements are the same for the consumption of the exportable and the 
importable goods. Nevertheless, in a monetary economy where  0 xm φ φ ≠≠  the 
indirect effect owing to the asymmetric cash requirements is present. The sign of this 
effect depends on the magnitude of  x φ  relative to that of  . m φ  In particular, if the 
exportable good requires more cash balances per unit of value than the importable 
goods, i.e., x m φ φ > , and hence  0 δ < , then the monetary distortion affects welfare 
negatively; that is, the direct and indirect effects work in opposite directions. Thus, if 
the adverse monetary distortion is sufficiently large to outweigh the direct welfare-
improving effect, then a uniform proportional cut in tariffs decreases a country’s 
welfare.  
Equation (8) indicates that a radial reduction of import tariffs has an ambiguous 
effect on government revenue. On the one hand, holding the level of imports constant, 
a radial reduction of tariffs reduces tariff revenues. On the other hand, a radial 
                                                 
12 The substitution matrix will be negative definite provided there is some substitutability between the 
numeraire good and at least one other good (see Neary 1998).  
13 For the intuition of this welfare-enhancing result of uniform proportional cuts in tariffs see footnote 2 
in Ju and Krishna (2000). They also provide intuition for another popular tariff reform rule, the so-
called concertina rule. According to this rule, the highest tariff is reduced to next highest level, while 
holding all other tariff rates constant.    
  7reduction of import tariffs may increase tariff revenues, because the level of imports 
rises.   
Next we examine the effects of a radial reduction of import tariffs on market 
access. Solving equation (7) for du and substituting to equation (6) we obtain, 




q dA p t Sdt E dt βδ β ′ ′ =+ − .  (9)




qu u qu pE E t E β ′ ′ =− )
v  is the marginal propensity to spend on importable 
goods and is assumed to be strictly between zero and one. If we set  0 xm φ φδ == =  
and  dt t θ =−  in equation (9), we derive equation (15) in Ju and Krishna (2000), 
which in terms of our notation is written as  ( )
w dA p t St θβ ′ =− + . Accordingly, the 
effect of an isolated tariff reform has an ambiguous effect on market access. 
Nevertheless, in a monetary framework, when  x m φ φ ≠ 0 ≠  there is a second (indirect) 
effect due to the asymmetric cash requirements, which is represented by the second 
term on the RHS of equation (9). The sign of this term is also ambiguous since it 
depends on the sign of δ .  
Ju and Krishna (2000) also consider a rule of the form  ( )
w dt p t θ β =− +  (the 
“Ju-Krishna rule”).  They show that such a rule increases import value for a small 
open economy.
14 In a monetary environment, however, as it can be seen after direct 
substitution in (9), this reform rule has ambiguous effects on market access. The 
following proposition summarizes our results in this sub-section.  
 
Proposition 1. In a small open monetary economy, a proportional reduction of only 
tariffs has an ambiguous effect on welfare and will decrease it if: i)  0 xm φ φδ >⇒ < , 
and ii) the indirect effect (monetary distortion) outweighs the direct effect. Under the 
same conditions,  a proportional reduction of tariffs alone according to the “Ju-




                                                 
14 Note that even though the “Ju-Krishna rule” increases market access, it cannot ensure welfare 
improvement. This result can be derived in terms of our notation by substituting  ()
w dt p t θβ =− +  in 
equation (7) and setting  0; xm φφδ == = moreover, it remains valid in the current monetary framework 
as well. 
  83.2 Tariff-Tax Reform 
Next we examine the implications of coordinated tariff and consumption tax reforms 
that leave all consumer prices unchanged, i.e., 0 dq = , holding production taxes 
constant. In the present context of domestic taxes and import tariffs, a radial reduction 
of all tariffs combined with an increase of all consumption taxes so as to leave the 
consumer prices unchanged, is dt θλ = , where λ  is the vector of net production 
subsidies on the imported goods. Using equation (5) and that dt θλ =  we obtain, 
 
  0 pp pp du R dt R λ θλ λ ′ ′ Ω= = > .  (10)
 
Furthermore, using equations (4) and (10), we obtain  
 
  0
v qu p p p u p dG E du R dt R dt E du R γλ θ λ ′′ ′′ =+ − = − > .  (11)
 
Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994), Keen and Ligthart (2002) and KR have shown, within 
barter frameworks and with no production taxes, that a coordinated tariff-tax reform 
increases welfare and government revenue. Equations (10) and (11) indicate that this 
result is valid even in the presence of asymmetric cash requirements between the 
exportable and importable goods. Intuitively, since a coordinated tariff-tax reform 
leaves consumer prices unchanged, the monetary distortion introduced by the 
asymmetric cash requirements is neutralized. However, in the present context of 
production taxes in addition to import tariffs and consumption taxes, this result holds 
under the assumption that all imported goods are burdened with a net production 
subsidy.   
Consider next the effect of coordinated tariff-tax reforms on market access. 





qu p p d A pEd u pRd t ′′ =− .  (12)
 
Using (10) to substituting for   in equation (12), we have   du
 
 
                                       () .
w
pp dA p R dt βλ ′ =− (13)
 
  9By setting dt θλ =  in equation (13) we obtain  ()
w
pp dA p R θ βλ λ ′ =− , and thus a 
tariff-tax reform that keeps consumer prices unchanged has an ambiguous effect on 
market access, regardless of the presence or not of asymmetric cash requirements. The 
explanation is once again that this type of reform keeps consumer prices constant and 
thus the monetary distortion is neutralized.   
To complete this subsection, we consider now the effect on market access of a 
reduction of tariffs according to the “Ju-Krishna rule” combined with an equal 
increase of consumption taxes so as to leave consumer prices unchanged. According 
to the “Ju-Krishna rule” for the coordinated tariff-tax reforms, the reform is of the 
type  , appropriately modified to take into account the presence of 
production taxes in addition to import tariffs and consumption taxes. By substituting 
this formula in equation (13) we obtain  , and thus the 
“Ju-Krishna rule” increases import value in the present framework, under the 
assumption that all imported goods are burdened with a net production subsidy. We 
summarize these arguments in the following proposition.
(
w dt p θβ λ =− )
)
w
                                                
() (
w
pp dA p R p θβ λ β λ ′ =− −
15
 
Proposition 2. Consider a small open monetary economy where government revenue 
is financed by tariff and domestic tax revenues. Then, a radial reduction of import 
tariffs combined with an equal increase in consumption taxes that leaves consumer 
prices unchanged increases welfare and government revenue, if all imported goods 
are burdened with a net production subsidy. Under the same condition, a reduction of 
tariffs according to the “Ju-Krishna rule” accompanied by an equal increase in 
consumption taxes that keeps consumer prices constant increases market access.  
 
In the next subsection, we compare the welfare and market access effects of a 
tariff reform alone with those of a coordinated tariff-tax reform. This comparison is 




15 KR in their paper extend the “Ju-Krishna rule” in order to examine how a reduction of tariffs 
according to this rule affect market access, when is accompanied by an equal increase of consumption 
taxes (the “modified Ju-Krishna rule”). They show that the “modified Ju-Krishan rule” cannot ensure 
an increase in welfare. The same result obtains in the current framework as well.   
  103.3 Tariff-Tax Reform versus Tariff Reform 
We compare the welfare effects of the two reforms in the case where the initial 
consumption and production taxes are zero. In this case it follows that  t γ =  and 
t λ =− . Subtracting equation (10) from equation (7), setting dt t θ =− , and 
substituting for  (1 )
vv qq p p SE R δ = +−  we obtain, 
 
Tariff Tariff Tax du du
− ⎡⎤ Ω− ⎣⎦ (1 )
vv v qq p p q p p tE R d t E d t t R δδ ⎡⎤ ′′ =+ − − + ⎣⎦ d t ′  
(1 )
vv v qq q tE t E t θ δθ δ ′ ′ = −+ + .  (14)
 
Setting 0 xm φ φδ == = in equation (14), the second term on the RHS vanishes and we 
obtain the result in KR, namely that in a barter economy a proportional reduction in 
tariffs leads to a higher increase in welfare than a proportional coordinated tariff-tax 
reform that keeps consumer prices unchanged.  
The same result emerges in a monetary economy if  0 xm φ φ = > , since even in 
this case  0 δ = . Hence this extends the results of KR in the context of a trading 
monetary economy with the same cash-requirements for all goods. 
 Nevertheless, if  0 xm φ φ ≠≠ , then, in addition to the standard direct effect (the 
first term on the RHS of 11), there is also an indirect effect, which is represented by 
the second term on the RHS of equation (11). In particular, if the exportable sector is 
more liquidity constrained, i.e.,  0 xm φ φδ >⇒ < , then the term 
v q Et θδ ′  will be 
negative and thus the overall welfare effect resulting from a proportional reduction of 
tariffs alone, is ambiguous. Moreover, if this monetary distortion effect dominates the 
direct effect, then the result in KR that a coordinated proportional tariff-tax reform 
increases welfare by less than a proportional reduction of only tariffs is reversed.  
Next we compare the market access effects of both reforms according to the 
“Ju-Krishna rule.” Subtracting equation (13) from equation (9) and setting 
 yields  (
w dt t p θβ =− + )
 
Tariff Tariff Tax dA dA
− − (1 )( )
vv v
w
qq q p tE d t Ed t δβ δ β ′ ′ =+ + −  
() ( (1 ) ( )
vv v
ww
qq q tp E tp E tp δθ β β θ δ β β ′ ′ =− + + + + + )
w . (15)
 
  11KR show that the reform of tariffs alone according to the “Ju-Krishna rule” increases 
market access by more than a reduction of tariffs according to the “Ju-Krishna rule” 
combined with an equal increase in consumption taxes. This can also be seen from 
equation (15) where by setting  0 δ =  we obtain 
Tariff Tariff Tax dA dA
− −=  
. Nevertheless, in a monetary environment, there is 
an additional effect (captured by the second term on RHS of 15) due to the 




qq tp E tp θβ β ′ −+ + > 0
w
δ  
and this renders the overall effect ambiguous. We summarize these in the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 3. In a small open monetary economy, a radial reduction of import tariffs 
combined with an equal increase in consumption taxes that keeps consumer prices 
constant increases welfare by more than a proportional reduction of tariffs alone if: i) 
0 xm φ φδ >⇒ <  and ii) the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect. Under the same 
conditions, a reduction of tariffs according to the “Ju-Krishna rule” accompanied by 
an equal increase in consumption taxes that keeps consumer prices constant increases 
market access by more than a proportional reduction of tariffs alone. 
 
4. Export and Production Tax Reforms 
In this section we examine how a reduction in export taxes with an offsetting increase 
in production taxes that keeps the producer prices unchanged ( ) affects the 
welfare of a small open monetary economy, when government revenue is financed by 
export and domestic (production and consumption) taxes. To facilitate the analysis we 
now assume that the numeraire good is the importable one. The domestic consumer 
prices of the non-numeraire goods are given by 
0 dp =
w qp t τ = ++, where   is the 
vector of the export taxes. On the other hand, the domestic producer prices for the 
non-numeraire goods are 
0 t <
w p pt ε =+ − . Note that since we denote export taxes by 
, a reduction of their size implies that, algebraically, t rises. In the present 
context of domestic taxes and export taxes, a radial reduction of export taxes 
combined with an equal increase of production taxes so as to leave the producer prices 
unchanged, is 
0 t <
dt θγ = − , where γ  is the vector of net consumption subsidies on the 
exported goods. 
  12As shown by Keen and Ligthart (2002) and Emran (2005), a reform that keeps 
producer prices unchanged increases welfare and revenue.
16 Intuitively, this occurs 
because an export tax is simultaneously a consumption subsidy and a production tax. 
A reform strategy that leaves producer prices unchanged is equivalent to a reduction 
in the consumption subsidy at an unchanged production tax. Thus, the revenue 
increases because the cost of the subsidy has been reduced. In addition, this reform 
strategy is welfare-enhancing since it improves consumption efficiency by reducing 
excessive consumption of exportable goods.  
However, in our framework of a monetary small open economy with a 
generalized CIA constraint, there is an additional distortionary effect. In particular, 
since this reform increases consumer prices, the monetary distortion is exacerbated 
when  x m φ φ >  relative to the case  x m φ φ < , and hence welfare is affected negatively. 
Thus, the overall welfare effect is ambiguous. To examine how a radial reduction of 
all export taxes combined with an equal increase in production taxes that keeps 
producer prices unaffected changes welfare and government revenue in the presence 
of a CIA constraint, set    and  0 dp = dt θγ = −  in equation (5)  
 
  (1 )
vv v qq q du E dt E dt δγ δ ′′ Ω= + − (1 )
vv v qq q EE θ δ γγ θδ γ ′ ′ = −+ + .  (16)
 
Furthermore, using equations (4) and (16), we obtain 
 
  (1 ) (1 )
vv v v qq q q u u dG E E E du E du E
v q θ γθ δ γ γγ θ δ γ ′′ ′ = − −+ + = −+ ′
                                                
.  (17)
 
Equation (16) indicates that a reduction in export taxes with an offsetting increase in 
production taxes, so that the producer prices remain unchanged, has an ambiguous 
effect on welfare in the presence of asymmetric cash requirements. The first term on 
the RHS of equation (16) denotes the standard direct effect that affects welfare 
positively, if all exported goods are burdened with a net consumption subsidy. The 
second term on the RHS denotes the indirect effect on welfare due to difference in 
 
16 Emran (2005) considers a selective reform strategy where a reduction in export tax on a given 
commodity is offsetting by an equal increase in production tax. Emran and Stiglitz (2003) examine how 
a radial uniform reduction of all export taxes that is accompanied with an equal increase of production 
taxes that leaves producer prices constant affects welfare. They show that this radial reform increases 
welfare and revenue unambiguously. However, in the presence of an informal segment in the economy, 
this radial reform may be welfare and revenue reducing. 
  13cash requirements between exportable and importable goods. The sign of this term is 
ambiguous and depends on the size of  x φ  relative to that of  m φ . In particular, if the 
cash-requirement ratio for purchasing the exportable goods is higher than the cash-
requirement for purchasing the importable good, i.e., 0 xm φ φδ >⇒ > , then this 
second term is negative. Thus, the overall welfare effect depends on the relative 
strength of the two opposing effects.  
Equation (17) indicates that this type of reform raises government revenue even 
in the presence of asymmetric cash requirements. However, in the current context of 
consumption taxes in addition to export and production taxes, a sufficient condition 
for this type of reform to increase government revenue is that all exported goods are 
burdened with a net consumption subsidy. 
 
Proposition 4. Consider a small open monetary economy where government revenue 
is financed by export and domestic tax revenues. Then, a radial reduction in export 
taxes combined with an offsetting increase  in the production taxes, so that the 
producer prices remains unchanged, has an ambiguous effect on welfare and will 
decrease it  if the following conditions hold:  i)  0 xm φ φδ >⇒ > , ii) the indirect effect 
dominates the direct one, and iii) all exported goods are burdened with a net 
consumption subsidy. Also, this reform increases government revenue if all exported 
goods are burdened with a net consumption subsidy. 
 
The results derived so far in the literature depend critically on the assumption 
that there are no financial constraints in the economy. Our results show that, when 
financial constraints are taken into account then the reduction of all export taxes 
combined with an equal increase in production taxes so as to leave producer prices 
unchanged may reduce welfare. Thus, the existence of ‘win-win’ reform strategies in 
a monetary economy depends crucially on the nature of the CIA constraint for 
purchasing goods.       
 
5. Conclusions 
A voluminous theoretical literature examines the welfare and revenue effects of 
coordinated tariff-tax reforms. Recently considerable attention has been paid also to 
the market access effects of reform strategies. Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Moller 
  14(2008) have shown, within a barter economy, that coordinated tariff-tax reforms are 
less efficient to improve market access and welfare than reforms that involve only 
tariffs. 
 In this paper, we have extended the analysis of Kreickemeier and Raimondos-
Møller (2008) for a generalized cash-in-advance economy. We have shown that the 
existence of a financial constraint weakens and may reverse the results in KR. 
Moreover, we show that if the exportable goods are more liquidity constrained then 
tariff-tax reforms that leave consumer prices unchanged increase welfare and may 
increase market access by more than the reforms of only tariffs. Also, in the presence 
again of a financial constraint, a reform strategy that leaves producer prices 
unchanged may be less desirable or even undesirable if the exportable goods are more 
liquidity constrained.  
Trade and tax reform policies are among the conditions that are widely used in 
IMF’s and World Bank’s structural adjustment and stabilization programs for 
developing countries. This paper has shown that accounting for a financial constraint, 
a typical feature of developing economies, is not just a theoretical curiosity and can 
have profound implications regarding the effects of such programs.    
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